Sisyphean Failure at Old Dominion

July 4, 2016, came and went with little more than the typical fanfare of America's celebration of independence. Across the United States, fireworks rang out but no bombs went off, and no American families were faced with the tragic news of loss to the Islamic State's brutal global campaign of violence. Yesterday, nearly ten years later, that was not the case on the Old Dominion campus when Mohamed Bailor Jalloh followed through on his 2016 aspirations to carry out an attack targeting the military community during the holy month of Ramadan.

July 4, 2016, also fell during Ramadan, which many Islamic State fighters believed multiplied the rewards they would receive should they obtain martyrdom during this timeframe. Where better to achieve said martyrdom than within the heart of the disbelievers during their most vaunted celebration—or so the theory went. Needless to say, the summer of 2016 was one of the busiest periods on record for the FBI's counterterrorism program.

In the early hours of July 4th, just before the fajr (dawn) prayer in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, security officials approached a suspicious individual across the street from the US Consulate prompting the man to detonate a suicide belt before reaching their target—presumably Americans. Three other suicide bombers attacked other targets across the Kingdom that day. A spokesman for the Saudi interior ministry later alleged the attacks were planned from Syria.

Days earlier, Jasanazim Rosni and others attacked the Movida nightclub in Malaysia with a grenade likely paid for by Philippine-based Islamic State financier Russell Salic. Salic was a previous associate of al-Bab, Syria-based Islamic State external operations planner Abu Sa'ad al-Sudani, AKA Abu Issa al-Amriki.

Sudani had been attempting to coordinate attacks targeting US holiday celebrations since at least December 2015 when New York-based Islamic State supporter Emanual L. Lutchman was prevented from attacking local New Year's Eve celebrations. Lutchman would later be sentenced to 20 years in federal prison for his efforts.

Sudani's New Year's Eve failure did not hamper his efforts. In the early months of 2016, his recruits began planning for summer attacks in New York City. Sudani would not see the plans come to fruition. On April 22, 2016, after secretly planning and directing plots across the globe, including in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, Sudani was killed in a US airstrike along with his wife, Australian national Shadi Jabar Khalil Mohammad, AKA Umm Isa Amriki, a popular female recruiter.

Despite his demise, his intentions lived on. The DOJ later unsealed charges which revealed the extent of plotting by Canadian citizen Abdulrahman El Bahnasawy, Pakistan-based US citizen Talha Haroon, and Philippine financier Salic. After being sentenced for his part in the New York City plot, Bahnasawy went on to attack two corrections officers, stabbing one in the head and face, while stabbing the other in the hand. Bahnasawy pled guilty to the stabbings and claimed the attack was carried out on behalf of the Islamic State.

As July 4, 2016, approached, the remains of Sudani's network were slowly being dismantled by federal law enforcement and intelligence services, but just days before the holiday one former Sudani contact walked into a firearms dealership outside the nation's capital and purchased an AR-15 rifle. Months earlier he had expressed his desire to plan a martyrdom operation targeting members of the military during Ramadan.

On July 3, 2016, former National Guard member Mohamed Bailor Jalloh was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for attempting to provide material support to the Islamic State. Jalloh claimed he became radicalized while listening to lectures by then-deceased AQAP cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. He aspired to carry out a Fort Hood-style attack under the direction of Sudani. He later admitted to having attempted to join the Islamic State while traveling in Nigeria.

On October 27, 2016, Jalloh pled guilty. The Department of Justice recommended a 20 year sentence—in line with the severity of the plot Jalloh aspired to assist. Jalloh's defense argued for 78 months (6.5 years). In arguing for his short sentence, Jalloh's defense made numerous unfounded arguments and strategic mistakes, which should have been more thoroughly debunked.

While discussing Jalloh's initial reticence to cooperate, court documents fail to highlight the obvious proximity of Jalloh's arrest to the holiday and end of Ramadan. Court documents also repeatedly emphasize Jalloh's own retelling of his initial meeting of Sudani and return to the United States; however, they fall short of confronting the fact that a naturalized US citizen came into contact with a known ISIS external operations plotter while co-located with ISIS fighters in a conflict zone, then returned to the United States to engage in a domestic plot.

It never seemed to occur to anyone that Jalloh may have been minimizing his reason for returning to the United States to cover his tracks. In fact, the defense repeatedly brought up Jalloh's interest in finding a spouse as an alternative theory. They failed to mention the popular conception among Islamic State fighters that it is preferable to 'complete one's religion' by—among other things—obtaining a wife prior to engaging in martyrdom operations. Indeed, Jalloh may have been interested in marrying, but that did not negate his parallel interest in violent jihad.

Lastly, the court showed deference by citing his National Guard service as partial justification for a reduced sentence. Nidal Hasan was never formally disciplined by the US Army prior to his attack at Fort Hood, Texas, either. In fact, it is precisely because of his violation of his oath that Jalloh should have been held to a stricter expectation than his civilian peers.

On February 10, 2017, Jalloh was sentenced to 11 years in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. He was also credited with time served since his arrest. As special conditions of any future release, Jalloh was ordered to participate in a substance abuse treatment program and mental health treatment. He was prohibited from possessing controlled substances, firearms, or other dangerous weapons.

More importantly, Jalloh was ordered to submit to a computer monitoring program and barred from communication or affiliation with any terrorist organization, which any sufficiently administered computer monitoring program should be well postured to detect. In 2024, Jalloh was released on probation and began supervised release.

Jalloh was not the only Sudani recruit to receive a light sentence. In July 2018, Ohio-based Aaron Travis Daniels, AKA Harun Muhammad, AKA Abu Yusef, was sentenced to a mere 80 months for attempting to travel to join the Islamic State in Libya. He is subject to a lifetime of supervised release, including special conditions such as computer monitoring. The government initially recommended a 15-17 year term of imprisonment partially due to his previously expressed desire to carry out an attack within the West. His defense recommended two years of confinement.

Daniels was released from federal prison and began supervised release on July 14, 2021. On December 19, 2025, a Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Supervision and a Supervised Release Violation Report were filed. Despite issuing a summons, the court has repeatedly postponed the hearings, most recently delaying until May 14, 2026. The US Attorney's Office in the Southern District of Ohio has shown no objection to Daniels' continuous delay. Details of Daniels' violations were not readily available through court records.

The United States government has continuously undermined its own counterterrorism efforts since before 9/11. Volumes could be (and have been) written about Bush's 'Mission Accomplished' speech, or Obama's premature withdrawal from Iraq leading to the rise of ISIS, but we don't have to go that far back. Every administration has shared in this failure. In December 2018, Donald Trump gave his own 'Mission Accomplished' speech on Twitter, which promptly led to the protestful resignation of then Defense Secretary James Mattis.

Prior to his departure from office, Trump struck a deal with the Afghan Taliban for a full U.S. troop withdrawal by May 2021, which ultimately thrust the country into chaos that culminated with the Abbey Gate bombing targeting US troops and Afghan civilians during evacuations at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in August 2021. The second Trump administration has repeatedly attempted to shift all of the blame for these events onto the Biden administration. It's not that simple.

Abbey Gate attack planner Mohammad Sharifullah subsequently admitted to having joined the Islamic State in 2016, having been arrested in Afghanistan in 2019, and having escaped from prison due to the Afghan Taliban takeover just weeks before the Abbey Gate bombing. A subsequent statement by the White House indicated the bomber had also been a previous detainee who escaped prison due to the Taliban takeover that resulted from Trump's negotiations.

Many of the details remain sealed, but a CIPA motion in August 2025 indicated it contained information that "could be problematic to both the United States and the defense if released publicly." It's unclear what could be more problematic than the death of 13 US service members and over 160 Afghan civilians. Perhaps it's something to do with the continued degradation of counterterrorism efforts by the Trump administration's ludicrous belief that claiming victory is the same as achieving victory?

US counterterrorism failures didn't begin with the second Trump administration. In fact, many found their roots in the first Trump administration and grew out of the installation and growth of unqualified executive leaders in the FBI and partner organizations. This trend has created the environment the administration currently exploits to further authoritarian policies and personal vendettas under the loose guise of justice.

These executives are now likely more focused on proving their loyalty in hopes of rapid accession than preserving any semblance of actual justice. As a result, counterterrorism teams are left running on skeleton crews while being simultaneously pressured to support legally dubious deportation agendas, identify Iranian threats to domestic security, persecute left-wing activists for petty vandalism, all while somehow finding the time to keep protecting Americans from the real threats that never truly subsided despite Trump's repeated claims of victory.

The shooting at Old Dominion by Mohammed Bailor Jalloh was entirely preventable. Our government failed and let it happen.